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INTEGRATING LAWFARE AND WARFARE 
JOEL P. TRACHTMAN* 
Abstract: Current military campaigns are not waged solely on the 
physical battlefield, but in multiple other arenas. One such arena is lawfare: 
legal activity that supports, undermines, or substitutes for other types of 
warfare. In today’s law-rich environment, with an abundance of legal rules 
and legal fora, strategists must evaluate the full scope of possible legal ar-
gumentation. Lawfare can substitute for warfare where it provides a means 
to compel specified behavior with fewer costs than kinetic warfare, or even 
in cases where kinetic warfare would be ineffective. As a result, lawfare can 
be strategically integrated into military command structures to bring about 
desired outcomes. 
INTRODUCTION 
Both kinetic warfare and legal dispute are forms of contestation.1 Con-
testation can be physical or symbolic.2 Legal arguments or claims are one 
type of symbolic contestation.3 Other types of symbolic contestation may be 
based on historical justification, moral philosophy, or religious doctrine.4 
Symbolic contestation may be used alongside or in place of physical contes-
tation.5 Although we may plan strategy around geographically defined con-
tested arenas like the South China Sea, the Crimea, or Syria, we may also 
consider functionally defined arenas such as the cyber or biological arenas.6 
Arenas for contestation may be geographic or functional, physical, or symbol-
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 1  See ORDE F. KITTRIE, LAWFARE: LAW AS A WEAPON OF WAR 1, 3 (2016); Timothy Noah, 
Birth of a Washington Word, SLATE (Nov. 20, 2002, 6:40 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_
and_politics/chatterbox/2002/11/birth_of_a_washington_word.html [https://perma.cc/A4AU-B6JW]. 
 2 See KITTRIE, supra note 1, at 6–7. 
 3 See id.  
 4 See Gerrie Ter Haar, Religion: Source of Conflict or Resource for Peace?, in BRIDGE OR 
BARRIER: RELIGION, VIOLENCE, AND VISIONS FOR PEACE 1, 13 (Gerrie Ter Haar & James J. 
Busuttil eds., 2005).  
 5 See KITTRIE, supra note 1, at 6–7. 
 6 See Peter Navarro, China’s Non-Kinetic “Three Warfares” Against America, NAT’L INT. 
(Jan. 5, 2016), http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/chinas-non-kinetic-three-warfares-against-
america-14808 [https://perma.cc/S4R8-XJCC]; see, e.g., infra notes 49–70, 85–91 and accompany-
ing text. 
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ic.7 Any particular conflict may play out on multiple boards at once, and a 
move that is advantageous to a cause on one board may be disadvantageous 
on another board. The legal battlefield is largely a symbolic functional arena.8 
We may refer to legal activity that supports, undermines, or substitutes for 
other types of warfare as “lawfare.”9 Because of its capacity to support, un-
dermine, or substitute, lawfare must be integrated into military strategy.10 
I. DEFINING LAWFARE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
Retired Air Force General, now a professor, Charles Dunlap has de-
fined “lawfare” as “the strategy of using—or misusing—law as a substitute 
for traditional military means to achieve a warfighting objective.”11 Is this a 
good thing or a bad thing? When the school at which I teach, The Fletcher 
School of Law and Diplomacy, was founded in 1933, the idealistic motiva-
tion was to make law applicable to conflicts between countries and thereby 
to eliminate war.12 To those people, lawfare as a substitute for kinetic war-
fare seemed pretty good.13 
The modern conventional idea of lawfare stems from the idea that a 
political group will seek to use humanitarian law—the law of armed con-
flict—to hamper or punish military action by another political group.14 The 
initial way that lawfare was considered by Dunlap and others was in an 
asymmetric circumstance where the weaker party, such as ISIS, the Taliban, 
or Hamas, would use humanitarian law improperly to hamper or punish op-
                                                                                                                           
 7 See, e.g., Navarro, supra note 6.  
 8 See KITTRIE, supra note 1, at 6–7.  
 9 See Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Lawfare Today: A Perspective, 3 YALE J. INT’L AFFAIRS 146, 
146 (2008), http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5892&context=faculty_
scholarship [https://perma.cc/G6GQ-6Z7Y]. 
 10 See Lawfare, the Latest in Asymmetries, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Mar. 18, 2003), http://
www.cfr.org/defense-and-security/lawfare-latest-asymmetries/p5772 [https://perma.cc/7KT3-Q38T]. 
 11 Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Lawfare Today . . . and Tomorrow, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE 
CHANGING CHARACTER OF WAR 315, 315 (Raul A. “Pete” Pedrozo & Daria P. Wollschlaeger eds., 
2011) [hereinafter Dunlap, Lawfare Today]; see also Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Law and Military Inter-
ventions: Preserving Humanitarian Values in 21st Century Conflicts 4 (Nov. 29, 2001), http://
people.duke.edu/~pfeaver/dunlap.pdf [https://perma.cc/7J5V-MG3D] [hereinafter Dunlap, Law 
and Military Interventions]. Dunlap’s 2001 paper was the first modern use of the concept, alt-
hough in 1999 Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, two officers in China’s People’s Liberation Army, 
began referring to warfare through law, by which they meant “seizing the earliest opportunity to 
set up regulations.” LIANG QIAO & XIANGSUI WANG, UNRESTRICTED WARFARE (1999) http://
redreform.com/unrestrictedwarfare.htm [https://perma.cc/4X94-64RV]. This concept is familiar to 
lawyers and may bear some similarity to the U.S. freedom of navigation operations and other 
efforts to shape international law, but it is not directly related to Dunlap’s idea of lawfare. See id.  
 12 See Mission & Impact, FLETCHER SCH. OF L. & DIPL., TUFTS U., http://fletcher.tufts.edu/
About/Mission-and-Impact [https://perma.cc/6YK8-YBJL] (last visited Apr. 28, 2016). 
 13 See id.  
 14 See Dunlap, Lawfare Today, supra note 11, at 316. 
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posing forces.15 Jack Goldsmith—now a professor at Harvard Law School 
but then a lawyer in the George W. Bush Justice Department16—wrote in 
2002 that “various nations, NGO’s, academics, international organizations, 
and others in the international community have been busily weaving a web 
of international laws and judicial institutions that today threatens [U.S. 
Government] interests.” 17  This pejorative perspective is dependent on a 
view that the law will be misapplied by international public opinion or any 
available authoritative tribunals.18 The pejorative view of lawfare risks re-
jecting the democratic values and rule of law that we seek to defend.19 
There are a number of other ways in which lawfare may operate.20 Da-
vid Kennedy, also a professor at Harvard Law School, provided a more neu-
tral definition of lawfare.21 He called it the art of “managing law and war 
together.”22 In this Essay, I will develop a taxonomy as well as examples of 
different types of lawfare, cultivate a method for assessing the power and 
utility of lawfare, and suggest some parameters for an integrated lawfare 
command that would maximize the ability of a country to integrate lawfare 
in its offensive and defensive operations. 
II. OPERATING IN A LAW-RICH ENVIRONMENT 
In advanced market-based societies, there is a growing amount of 
law.23 This law addresses all sorts of issues, including but not limited to 
personal security, taxes, environmental protection, and anticompetitive 
                                                                                                                           
 15 See id; QIAO & WANG, supra note 11, at 12. 
 16 Goldsmith served in the George W. Bush administration as Special Counsel at the Depart-
ment of Defense and then Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel. JACK 
GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRA-
TION 18, 21 (2007). 
 17 Id. at 60 (internal quotations omitted).  
 18 See id. at 59, 61. 
 19 See id. at 63.  
 20 See DAVID KENNEDY, OF WAR AND LAW 125 (2006).  
 21 See id.  
 22 Id.  
 23 See, e.g., Laurie Burkitt & Kersten Zhang, Cough It Up: A Guide to China’s New Foreigner 
Social Security Tax, WALL ST. J.: CHINA REAL TIME REP. (Oct. 28, 2011, 9:38 PM), http://blogs.
wsj.com/chinarealtime/2011/10/28/cough-it-up-a-guide-to-chinas-new-foreigner-social-security-tax/ 
[https://perma.cc/F7RK-UC4Z]; U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, INCREASING ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGULATION, https://www.uschamber.com/regulations/increasing-environmental-regulations [https://
perma.cc/DYC4-MTEN] (last visited Apr. 28, 2016). See generally ALLEN & OVERY LLP, GLOBAL 
ANTITRUST TRENDS IN 2013, http://www.allenovery.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/Global_Anti
trust_Trends_in_2013.PDF [https://perma.cc/E6PG-ET78] (presenting discussions of competition 
laws in the global context). 
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practices of businesses.24 In the international law context, there is also a 
growing body of law of armed conflict, human rights law, environmental 
law, trade law, investment law, and tax law among many others.25 Human 
rights proliferate.26 Military forces must take into account environmental 
obligations, the health of the local population, local criminal responsibility 
for operations, and a host of other legal issues that have not traditionally 
been military concerns.27 
Sometimes a particular action or set of facts can be subject to multiple 
legal rules.28 Some of the legal rules might be permissive while others are 
restrictive.29 Traditional humanitarian law competes with human rights law 
for applicability.30 More and more often, the outcome of a legal argument or 
case will depend on how the case is characterized or framed.31 This pro-
vides an incentive for legal creativity—seeking to frame issues in innova-
tive ways and taking advantage of legal rules that help your side.32 
In addition to the increase in the number of legal rules, there is a pro-
liferation of legal fora with the possibility to apply either different rules or 
the same rules differently.33 The International Criminal Court is now a reali-
ty but so is the possible exercise of universal or other broad jurisdiction by 
                                                                                                                           
 24 See, e.g., Burkitt & Zhang, supra note 23; U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 23. 
See generally ALLEN & OVERY LLP, supra note 23 (presenting discussions of competition laws in 
the global context). 
 25  See Tseming Yang, The Top 10 Trends in International Environmental Law, SANTA 
CLARA L. DIGITAL COMMONS (2013), http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs/769/ [https://
perma.cc/EFG8-Z6C6]; Dr. Shavit Matias, Deputy Att’y Gen., Int’l Affairs, State of Isr., Keynote 
Speech at Georgetown U. L. Center’s Event on Globalization: Globalization, International Law, and 
the State (Oct. 17, 2008), http://www.justice.gov.il/Units/InternationalAgreements/Publications/
Variance/SMatiasGolbalizationGeorgetownKeynoteSpeech08.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7R5-2632]. 
See generally HOLMAN FENWICK WILLAN LLP, GLOBAL TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
AND THE LAWS THAT UNDERPIN THEM (2015), http://www.hfw.com/HFW-Global-trends-in-
international-trade-February-2015 [https://perma.cc/J2WY-DF5W] (discussing legal issues that 
must be resolved for the development of international trade).  
 26 See Jacob Mchangama & Guglielmo Verdirame, The Danger of Human Rights Prolifera-
tion: When Defending Liberty, Less Is More, FOREIGN AFF. (July 24, 2013), https://www.
foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2013-07-24/danger-human-rights-proliferation 
[https://perma.cc/8RGF-H4KS].  
 27 See, e.g., id.  
 28 See Yuval Shany, Human Rights and Humanitarian Law as Competing Legal Paradigms 
for Fighting Terror, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW 13, 13–14 (2011); William Abresch, A Human Rights Law of Internal Armed Con-
flict: The European Court of Human Rights in Chechnya, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 741, 743–44 (2005). 
 29 See Shany, supra note 28, at 14; Abresch, supra note 28, at 764–67.  
 30 See Shany, supra note 28, at 13, 24–27; Abresch, supra note 28, at 742–43. 
 31 See Abresch, supra note 28, at 752–53. 
 32 See JOEL P. TRACHTMAN, THE TOOLS OF ARGUMENT: HOW THE BEST LAWYERS THINK, 
ARGUE, AND WIN 40–46 (2013). 
 33 See Donald L. Morgan, Implications of the Proliferation of International Legal Fora: The 
Example of the Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 541, 541–42 (2002). 
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judges in places like Spain, the Netherlands, Argentina, or even the United 
States.34 Indeed, the United States also has, at times, heard—and may hear 
again—cases relating to foreign actions against foreign citizens.35 The re-
cent indictment of FIFA officers is an example of the United States exercis-
ing a broad scope of jurisdiction and is not completely different from the 
U.S. application of international rules against torture to Paraguayan police, 
except that in the FIFA context, the United States obtained arrest and extra-
dition assistance from the Swiss government.36 
Not only is it a law-rich environment, it is also a surveillance-rich en-
vironment in which information about possible violations and evidence of 
possible violations are much more readily available than in the past.37 What 
do Gaza and Ferguson, Missouri have in common? Both represented cir-
cumstances in which kinetic activities were under extraordinary scrutiny 
due to increasing availability of new recording technologies, drones, satel-
lites, social media, and extended traditional media concern.38 Governmental 
records of action seem less secure in this post-Snowden era than in the 
past.39 These new sources of surveillance and evidence empower legal ar-
gumentation and prosecution like never before.40 
III. STRATEGIC DENIAL/VICTORY 
The Nuremberg Principles and Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United 
Nations made aggressive war illegal.41 The Rome Statute of the Internation-
al Criminal Court also includes a crime of aggression.42 Now, it is true that 
aggressive war has not ceased, and there are several important examples.43 
But the fact that murders occur does not mean that there is no law against 
murder or that the law against murder is ineffective. A more careful analysis 
is required. 
                                                                                                                           
 34  See Universal Jurisdiction, GLOBAL POL’Y F., https://www.globalpolicy.org/international-
justice/universal-jurisdiction-6-31.html [https://perma.cc/44AR-MKX5] (last visited Apr. 28, 2016).  
 35 See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980).  
 36 See id.; Evan Perez & Shimon Prokupecz, U.S. Charges 16 FIFA Officials in Widening Probe, 
CNN (Dec. 3, 2015), http://edition.cnn.com/2015/12/03/sport/fifa-corruption-charges-justice-
department/ [https://perma.cc/WMH3-VC6S]. 
 37 See KITTRIE, supra note 1, at 48. 
 38 See Jonathan Rosenblum, Think Again: What Do Gaza and Ferguson Have in Common?, 
JERUSALEM POST (Sept. 4, 2014, 1:48 PM), http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Think-again-What-do-
Gaza-and-Ferguson-have-in-common-374418 [https://perma.cc/PJ4N-U77T]. 
 39 See KITTRIE, supra note 1, at 48. 
 40 See id. 
 41 See U.N. Charter art. 2(4); Formulation of the Nuremberg Principles, [1950] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. 
Comm’n 374, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.2.  
 42 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 5, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3.  
 43 See, e.g., Ukraine Crisis: Timeline, BBC NEWS (Nov. 13, 2014, 3:16 PM), http://www.bbc.
com/news/world-middle-east-26248275 [https://perma.cc/3JSP-NULH] [hereinafter Ukraine Crisis]. 
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In its most attractive form, lawfare would be used in place of kinetic 
warfare to prevent or even to roll back aggressive war and to restrict unjust 
actions.44 The question is not whether this is a theoretical possibility—it 
is—but rather whether it is a practical possibility in particular situations. 
Part of the planning for war ought to include the question of whether asser-
tions of the laws against aggressive war, along with available sanctions, will 
be sufficient to prevent aggressive war.45 Part of the development of a com-
prehensive lawfare strategy would involve identifying ways of increasing 
the non-kinetic costs of aggressive war in circumstances where additional 
costs might induce an opponent to abstain. This apparently was not the case 
when Russia decided to separate Crimea from the Ukraine,46 but the ques-
tion remains: could Russia’s opponents have found a way credibly to threat-
en higher costs with the effect of causing Russia to refrain? 
One way to increase the costs of aggression is to prevent the aggressor 
from relying on possible claims of the legality of intervention.47 This is 
costly in reputational terms as well as in reciprocity terms—it may be 
tougher for a violator to convince other countries to respect their interna-
tional legal obligations to the violator or to accept its promises in the fu-
ture.48 
In the case of the Crimea, Russia claimed that it was engaging in the 
right of self-defense on behalf of the ethnic Russian minority in Crimea, a 
claim that echoed Hitler’s claim to protect the Sudeten Germans in Czecho-
slovakia.49 There was no factual support for this claim, the persons alleged-
                                                                                                                           
 44 See Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Lawfare: A Decisive Element of 21st-Century Conflicts?, 54 
JOINT FORCE Q. 34, 35 (2009), http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6034
&context=faculty_scholarship [https://perma.cc/ES4M-CCPX].  
 45 See Julie Veroff, Note, Reconciling the Crime of Aggression and Complementarity: Un-
addressed Tensions and a Way Forward, 125 YALE L.J. 730, 762–64 (2016); Paul Temnycky, Are 
Sanctions Against Russia Enough?, FORDHAM POL. REV., http://fordhampoliticalreview.org/are-
sanctions-against-russia-enough/ [https://perma.cc/8QN4-D8D4] (last visited Apr. 28, 2016).  
 46 See William Mauldin, U.S. Sanctions Not Effective Against Russia, Senators Say, WALL ST. 
J.: WASH. WIRE (Aug. 31, 2014, 12:54 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2014/08/31/u-s-
sanctions-not-effective-against-russia-senators-say/ [https://perma.cc/3MMP-WULQ]; Peter Feaver 
& Eric Lorber, Understanding the Limits of Sanctions, LAWFARE BLOG: FOREIGN POL. ESSAY 
(July 26, 2015, 10:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/understanding-limits-sanctions [https://
perma.cc/BY6B-QJEK]. 
 47 See Rory Finnin & Thomas Grant, Don’t Call It a Civil War – Ukraine’s Conflict Is an Act 
of Russian Aggression, CONVERSATION (Aug. 24, 2015, 11:35 AM), http://theconversation.com/
dont-call-it-a-civil-war-ukraines-conflict-is-an-act-of-russian-aggression-46280 [https://perma.cc/
7U4E-FCD6]; Thomas Grant, Russian’s Invasion of Ukraine: What Does International Law Have 
to Say?, LAWFARE BLOG (Aug. 25, 2015, 7:45 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/russias-
invasion-ukraine-what-does-international-law-have-say [https://perma.cc/3T37-AAAS]. 
 48 See Finnin & Grant, supra note 47; Grant, supra note 47.  
 49 See Ukraine Crisis, supra note 43; Simona Kralova, Crimea Seen as ‘Hitler-Style’ Land 
Grab, BBC NEWS (Mar. 7, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26488652 [https://perma.
cc/YWT4-723A].  
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ly at risk were not Russian citizens, and there is probably no legal right to 
use force to protect citizens overseas.50 The Ukraine or its allies might have 
been wise to make a pre-emptive legal strike by seeking to demonstrate the 
good treatment of Russian ethnics in the Crimea.  Russia sought to legiti-
mize its action based on the emergent doctrine of humanitarian intervention, 
drawing analogies to the NATO action in Kosovo.51 Russia was also em-
boldened by the U.S. actions in Panama, Iraq, and elsewhere.52 These ac-
tions—perhaps distinguishable on their facts—were costly to the interna-
tional rule of law and to future arguments against aggression.53 Russia also 
made the claim that it had been invited on behalf of the legitimate govern-
ment, but the invitation came from Viktor Yanukovych after he had already 
lost effective control of the government of the Ukraine.54 
Of course, China has territorial objectives in the South China Sea.55 In 
2009, China made its famous “nine-dash line” claim in a formal notification 
to the United Nations.56 These territorial goals seem to combine an assertion 
of regional power with the desire for mineral and other resources in the 
South China Sea.57 China’s claim is based on certain alleged land features 
as the basis for marine entitlements under international law.58 
As an example of an integrated lawfare strategy, China is actively en-
hancing some of those land features in order to enhance its claims.59 This 
type of behavior was foreshadowed by the 1999 People’s Liberation Army 
                                                                                                                           
 50 See Ben Saul, The Battle for Legal Legitimacy in Crimea, ABC: DRUM (Mar. 2, 2014, 9:18 
PM), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-03-03/saul-the-battle-for-legal-legitimacy-in-crimea/5294828 
[https://perma.cc/3YHB-56LN].  
 51 See Bob Dreyfuss, Full Text and Analysis of Putin’s Crimea Speech, NATION (Mar. 19, 2014), 
http://www.thenation.com/article/full-text-and-analysis-putins-crimea-speech/ [https://perma.cc/72EU-
CTPH]. 
 52 See id.  
 53 See Neil Clark, Kosovo and Ukraine: Compare and Contrast, RT (Aug. 20, 2014, 10:14), https://
www.rt.com/op-edge/181580-kosovo-ukraine-compare-contrast/ [https://perma.cc/X9LY-2E4R]; Dreyfuss, 
supra note 51; Sarah de Geest, Russian Intervention in Ukraine: R2P Limits and Reclaiming the 
Concept and Narrative, HUM. SECURITY CTR. (Apr. 11, 2015), http://www.hscentre.org/russia-and-
eurasia/russian-intervention-ukraine-r2p-limits-reclaiming-concept-narrative/ [https://perma.cc/PHJ9-
4XMA].  
 54 See Louis Charbonneau, Russia: Yanukovich Asked Putin to Use Force to Save Ukraine, 
REUTERS (Mar. 3, 2014, 7:09 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-un-idUSBREA
2224720140304 [https://perma.cc/SKF2-J3RU]. 
 55 See generally CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, EXAMINING THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 
DISPUTES (Sept. 2015), http://csis.org/files/publication/151110_Hiebert_ExaminingSouthChinaSea_
Web.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VNN-AHHV] (compiling articles discussing the South China Sea dis-
putes).  
 56 Id. at 61, n.2.  
 57 See Q&A: South China Sea Dispute, BBC (Oct. 27, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/
world-asia-pacific-13748349 [https://perma.cc/YFP9-ZH5J]. 
 58 See id. 
 59 See id. 
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paper on “Unrestricted Warfare.”60 This is what the Naval War College’s 
Peter Dutton has characterized as China’s power and law approach, utilizing 
a force-structure component and a legal component.61 
Part of an integrated lawfare strategy is to enhance facts as a basis for 
legal claims as well as to argue for beneficial rules in the development of 
customary international law and treaty law.62 One U.S. response is its free-
dom of navigation operations, designed also to enhance facts as a basis for 
legal claims.63 
The Philippines has responded to China’s South China Sea ambitions 
by trying to undermine China’s claims through a challenge before an arbi-
tral tribunal under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS).64 This tactic is unavailable to the United States because it is 
not party to UNCLOS. 65 The United States often makes the calculation 
whether to enter into conventions like UNCLOS—anticipating that it will 
be on the defense—but perhaps it does not sufficiently value the possibility 
of using these rules on the offense. China refused to participate in UNCLOS 
arbitration, arguing that it opted out of the UNCLOS’s mandatory jurisdic-
tion under Article 298(1)(a) of UNCLOS.66 The tribunal, however, held that 
it has jurisdiction.67 On July 12, 2016, the tribunal found that there was no 
legal basis for China’s historic rights-based claim to sea resources within 
the nine-dash line. 68  China responded with a public relations campaign 
                                                                                                                           
 60 See QIAO & WANG, supra note 11, at 31–32. 
 61 Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Asia & the Pacific & the Subcomm. on Seapower & 
Projection Forces of the Armed Serv. Comm. of the H. Foreign Affairs Comm. Hearing on Chi-
na’s Maritime Disputes in the East and South China Seas, 113th Cong. (2014) (statement of Peter 
A. Dutton, Prof. & Dir., U.S. Naval War College), http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA05/2014
0114/101643/HHRG-113-FA05-Wstate-DuttonP-20140114.pdf [https://perma.cc/6CQQ-STFY]. 
 62 See Sean Mirski, How America Should Wage ‘Lawfare’ in the South China Sea, NAT’L INT. 
(June 4, 2015), http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-america-should-wage-lawfare-the-south-
china-sea-13040 [https://perma.cc/Y25L-VRGM]. 
 63 See id.  
 64 See Greg Torode, Philippines South China Sea Legal Case Against China Gathers Pace, REU-
TERS (Sept. 27, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/27/us-china-philippines-idUSBRE98
Q0BX20130927 [https://perma.cc/3QFJ-NAXC]. 
 65 See South China Sea Puts Pressure on US to Ratify UNCLOS, BLANK ROME LLP: NEWS 
(July 18, 2015), https://www.blankrome.com/index.cfm?contentID=31&itemID=3462 [https://
perma.cc/8598-6J29].  
 66 See U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 298(1)(a), Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter UNCLOS]; Torode, supra note 64.  
 67 See Phil. v. China, Case No. 2013-19, Award on Jurisdiction & Admissibility, at 149 (Perm. 
Ct. Arb. 2015), http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1506 [https://perma.cc/9WD8-8YD9]; 
Gregory Poling, The Philippines-China Arbitration: What Next?, DIPLOMAT (Aug. 1, 2015), http://
thediplomat.com/2015/08/the-philippines-china-arbitration-what-next/ [https://perma.cc/VP2E-KUSP]. 
 68 See Phil. v. China, Case No. 2013-19, Award (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016), https://pca-cpa.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/175/2016/07/PH-CN-20160712-Award.pdf [https://perma.cc/W56T-C269]. 
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against the tribunal’s determination, including displaying its response on a 
video billboard in Times Square, New York.69 
IV. OPERATIONAL DENIAL 
When General Dunlap began using the term “lawfare,” it was often 
seen as a pejorative term for a combined legal and public relations program 
aimed at hampering or restricting enemy operations, often in asymmetrical 
warfare.70 Dunlap argued that “there is disturbing evidence that the rule of 
law is being hijacked into just another way of fighting (lawfare), to the det-
riment of humanitarian values as well as the law itself.”71 This pejorative 
view is based on a certain perspective and an assumption that audiences—
whether the public or courts like the International Criminal Court—will 
extend the rules beyond what was intended or what is appropriate.72 Thus, 
in Dunlap’s 2001 article, he saw a dual goal of lawfare: (i) to deprive U.S. 
forces of certain weapons or tactics and (ii) to undermine the support of the 
U.S. public for U.S. military goals.73 
If legal rules are not to be simply victor’s justice and if they are to be 
consistent with the rule of law, however, we must counter, but in the end 
accept, the consequences of misinformed public opinion.74 This is one rea-
son why a robust public diplomacy program is important.75 Moreover, the 
rules must be applied by independent tribunals that are structured so as to 
maximize integrity and legal regularity. For the United States, if we could 
trust an international tribunal to apply law that the United States has accept-
ed with the integrity and legal regularity of our domestic courts, why would 
we not accept the jurisdiction of that tribunal as a way ex ante to show our 
audiences that we intend to comply with the law, and as a way ex post to 
definitively legitimize our actions? Not only do we achieve that benefit, but 
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we also achieve the benefit of more effective and more legitimate discipline 
on our opponents’ violations. 
The Palestinians and Israelis have raised this type of lawfare and coun-
ter-lawfare to a high art with much at stake in terms of domestic and inter-
national support and legitimacy.76 We might say that the Palestinian use of 
lawfare in this context is a kind of defensive lawfare, hampering the Israelis 
in using their preferred weapons.77 In addition, it has an offensive compo-
nent insofar as it seeks to lure Israel to take action that is subsequently used 
in a public relations and litigation campaign against Israel.78 
We can identify in the 2014 Gaza conflict—known by the Israelis as 
Operation Protective Edge—a rising challenge to existing conventional doc-
trine.79 The law of armed conflict rule of proportionality allows collateral 
damage to civilians so long as the collateral damage is necessary and justified 
by the value of the target.80 In connection with Operation Protective Edge, 
Hamas and its allies made persistent claims that Israeli action was illegally 
disproportionate because the number of Palestinian civilians killed was far 
greater than the number of Israeli civilians killed.81 The law of armed conflict 
principle of proportionality, however, prohibits military attacks anticipated to 
result in “incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian 
objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”82 Although the death of 
civilians on both sides is deeply regrettable, this fact is legally irrelevant un-
der current law.83 The Hamas claims may be seen as a first salvo in an effort 
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to change current law—or at least to change the public perception of current 
law—in order to restrain use of force against Hamas.84 
Another type of offensive use of lawfare is to use existing legal rules, 
such as trade and investment law, to undermine defensive actions that an 
opponent may take.85 For example, trade law may be used to restrict the 
ability of an enemy to avoid imports of Trojan horse-impregnated telecom-
munications network equipment or bio-hazard contaminated food.86 A 2013 
law requires certain U.S. government agencies to consider cybersecurity 
threats when sourcing telecommunications equipment from abroad. 87 
Around the same time, India began blocking imports of certain Chinese tel-
ecommunications equipment based on similar concerns.88 World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO) law permits security exceptions from all of its obliga-
tions, including obligations to permit imports and obligations to liberalize 
government procurement, but these security exceptions are generally condi-
tioned on there being in existence at the time the exception is used a war or 
other emergency in international relations.89 
V. RESPONDING TO MATERIEL DENIAL 
Availability of materiel has an important effect on the ability to wage 
war.90 One of the early predecessors of today’s European Union was the 
European Coal and Steel Community.91 It was proposed by French foreign 
minister Robert Schuman in 1950 with the goal of making war “not merely 
unthinkable, but materially impossible.” 92 The European Coal and Steel 
Community integrated production of coal and steel, both reducing inde-
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pendent national capacity to wage war and eliminating competition over 
these resources.93 
China has recently sought to restrict exports of rare earth materials, 
which are used in environmental goods, high tech goods, and weapons sys-
tems.94 China had important industrial policy reasons for doing so, but it 
also seemed to wish to make these goods, including weapons, more expen-
sive for its competitors to produce.95 The United States and other countries 
challenged China’s restrictions at the WTO as illegal restrictions on trade 
and were successful in inducing China to eliminate its restrictions.96 
Neither the United States nor China had sufficient motivation to go to 
war over rare earths, but here, we can see the application of WTO law and 
its mandatory adjudication as means for peaceful settlement of certain types 
of disputes.97 What do we learn here? Where the stakes are low enough and 
the institutions and other punishments are sufficient, law can induce coop-
erative behavior. 
Of course, international legal cooperation to impose sanctions on oppo-
nents, such as Soviet Bloc states during the cold war and Iraq, Iran, and Rus-
sia in more recent years, is a method of denying materiel to these oppo-
nents.98 
VI. MEASURING THE POWER OF LAWFARE 
This raises the question of how we can measure the power of lawfare, 
and thereby determine where it is a useful tool. It also raises the question of 
how international legal institutions can be modified to be more effective. 
Given the ambivalence of lawfare, we do not always want international law 
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to be more effective, but we would like to know how to make it more effec-
tive where it is desirable. 
Political scientists debate the extent to which states in international re-
lations seek absolute gains (to make themselves better off) or seek relative 
gains (to increase their advantage over competitors even if to do so they 
must make themselves worse off).99 In an implacable, cold war-type compe-
tition, it is easy to see the world in relative gains terms, especially where 
issues are directly related to security.100 On the other hand, in a less compet-
itive environment—perhaps where there is no other superpower or where 
issues are less directly related to security—we might see countries willing 
to cooperate in ways that make them better off, even if competitors are 
made better off to a greater extent.101 
From the standpoint of analyzing lawfare strategy, the only questions 
are what game are you and your opponent playing, and how does that de-
termination affect your decision? 
There are a number of ways in which law can affect decisions. First, 
there may be direct legal penalties that are designed to have compelling ef-
fect—the cost of the penalty is greater than the benefit of violation.102 Sec-
ond, there may be domestic audience costs.103 It may be that your citizens 
simply care about compliance with the law.104 Or, it may be that the legal 
rules have been set up in a way that involves reciprocal compliance and re-
ciprocal breach so that a domestic constituency will be harmed by your 
competitor’s breach in response to your breach.105 That domestic constitu-
ency will lobby for compliance.106 We see this dynamic in the trade law 
context, which involves important elements of reciprocity.107 Third, there 
may be foreign political costs.108 Being seen to be a violator of international 
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law may make it tougher to obtain assistance in some areas or to reach in-
ternational agreements in other areas.109 Violating international law in one 
area may undermine the international legal system and diminish its ability 
to provide benefits in trade, investment, environmental protection, human 
rights, security, and other fields.110 
Here, it is important to get an idea of what drives your opponent’s deci-
sionmaking and what will drive it in the future. Are there penalties available 
for violation that would be meaningful to this country or this non-state actor? 
Does this country have a lot of other international legal relationships that are 
important to it? Is it concerned with your compliance with the relevant inter-
national legal rules or even with other international legal rules? Then perhaps 
it will think about the shadow of the future before violating the obligation that 
concerns you. Do its citizens care about international law? Survey and exper-
imental evidence suggests that U.S. citizens care about compliance with in-
ternational law and that some other countries’ citizens care even more.111 
Based on your analysis of the domestic political dynamics of your target 
country, will these factors be sufficient to cause compliance? 
VII. LAW AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR KINETIC WARFARE 
So it is in this way that we can see lawfare as, in particular circum-
stances, a substitute for kinetic warfare.112 It substitutes for warfare where it 
provides a means by which to compel specified behavior with fewer costs 
than kinetic warfare, or even in cases where kinetic warfare would be inef-
fective.113 
It is difficult to say with certainty that any particular dispute that has 
been resolved through legal debate or formal dispute settlement would, if 
not for the legal resolution, have resulted in war.114 Yet, it seems likely that 
at least some disputes have had this character.115 Often the reference to in-
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ternational law or a court ruling can reduce pressure on governments to es-
calate to kinetic warfare.116 
VIII. TOWARD A LAWFARE “COMMAND” 
I understand that in actual combat operations of sophisticated military 
forces, rules of engagement and targeting decisions are often evaluated by 
lawyers or other officers with appropriate training in relevant law. But I 
wonder how much more extensive the integration of a lawfare command 
with kinetic commands might be. The following is a list of areas in which 
an integrated legal component may improve strategic and tactical outcomes: 
 a. Identify disputes in which legal resolution is unlikely in order to 
predict more accurately the context for kinetic disputes. 
 b. Join in the planning of new weapons systems and adaptation of 
existing weapons systems in order to maximize effectiveness giv-
en legal restraints. 
 c. Anticipate challenges to rules of engagement and target policies 
and identify methods to maximize effectiveness despite potential 
challenges. 
 d.  Identify circumstances where opponents are creating legal facts on 
the ground that may give them an advantage in future conflicts, 
such as the Chinese South China Sea operations. 
 e.  Identify circumstances in which it may be attractive to create legal 
facts on the ground for advantage. 
 f. Identify circumstances in which opponents are seeking to create 
international legal rules or modify or apply existing international 
legal rules that will restrict use of weapons in which your forces 
have an advantage. 
 g.  Propose international legal rules or modify or apply existing in-
ternational legal rules that will restrict use of weapons in which 
your forces are at a disadvantage. 
 h. Identify competitors’ efforts to block your access to materiel and 
formulate legal responses. 
 i. Identify competitors’ needs for materiel and seek to block access 
within applicable law. 
CONCLUSION 
We may understand lawfare as a modern innovation in international 
contention—a growing availability and use and sometimes abuse of law to 
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supplement or substitute for military operations. Lawfare can be used to 
bring to bear the power of law in order to win victories or in order to ham-
per enemies. It would be ignorant to assume that law is irrelevant, but it is 
also ignorant to assume that law is always effective. A nuanced lawfare 
strategy will examine the extent to which lawfare can be effective against a 
particular target in a particular circumstance. 
